The plaintiffs formerly employed as salesmen by the defendant Bristol-Myers Company (Bristol-Myers) appeal from judgments for the defendants. The trial Court entered directed verdicts for the defendants on the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants had unlawfully invaded their privacy. He also entered judgments for the defendants notwithstanding the jury's verdicts for the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs' claims that Bristol-Myers had terminated their employment in bad faith. *fn3 We affirm the judgments.

We summarize the evidence recognizing that in passing on the Court's allowance of the defendants' motions we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. D'Annolfo v. Stoneham Hous. Auth. 375 Mass. 650 657 (1978). Prior to February 1975 Bristol-Myers had employed the three plaintiffs as salesmen in the Boston area selling Bristol-Myers drug products to various purchasers such as hospitals physicians and drug stores. Each of the employment agreements was terminable at will. Flaherty had worked for Bristol-Myers for thirteen years; Cort for eleven years; and Schleffer for nine years. There was evidence that the plaintiffs had performed their duties well. In 1974 Bristol-Myers determined that the performance of its Boston sales division had been the worst of any of its sales divisions. The defendant Aldridge newly designated northeast regional sales manager instructed the defendant Pogorelc the Boston district sales manager to send a questionnaire to each Boston district salesman with instructions to each to answer and return the questionnaire. The plaintiffs and other salesmen objected to certain questions as highly personal and offensive and also as not related in any apparent way to their job performance. It is the demand that the plaintiffs answer this questionnaire that gives rise to their claim of invasion of privacy. We shall subsequently discuss the questions to which the plaintiffs objected.

Pogorelc told each plaintiff that the questionnaire had to be filled out completely. There was evidence that answers to such a questionnaire could be used as a type of psychiatric test. There was no evidence that the answers were so used or were intended to be so used. In November or December 1974 each plaintiff answered the questionnaire but failed to answer or in the case of Cort gave frivolous answers to certain questions. On February 19 1975 Pogorelc gave a letter of warning to each plaintiff. Each letter referred to the recipient's poor job performance. Pogorelc testified that a decision to discharge the plaintiffs had already been made when the letters were drafted and that the letters of warning were prepared to justify the discharges. Each plaintiff responded in writing that his letter of warning contained inaccuracies. There was evidence that sales in the Boston area normally credited to the plaintiffs had been adversely affected by Bristol-Myers's problems in producing one drug and by the loss of a bid on another drug which could have been sold to a group of hospitals.

In circumstances that need not be detailed each of the plaintiffs was discharged in February or March 1975. Each received the compensation and other payments to which he was entitled apart of course from the payments to which each claims in this action he is entitled. There was no evidence of any anticipated measurable future compensation based on past services to which the plaintiffs were entitled.

1. The Court properly allowed the defendants' motion for directed verdicts on the plaintiffs' claims for invasion of privacy under G. L. c. 214 SEC.1B and we affirm the judgments entered on this motion. Whatever unlawful invasion of privacy or other claim might have arisen if the defendants had obtained some of the information sought by the questionnaires the short answer is that the plaintiffs declined to provide any information they regarded as confidential or personal. The defendants' attempted invasion of privacy if it was one failed. Not even a beachhead was established. We are not concerned here with an employee who answered unreasonably intrusive personal questions under the threat of being discharged if he did not answer those questions.

2. The Court correctly allowed the defendants' motion for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts on the plaintiffs' claims that Bristol-Myers terminated their employment in bad faith. The plaintiffs rely on our opinion in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. 373 Mass. 96 (1977) and argue that Bristol-Myers terminated their employment in violation of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed by law in the at-will employment relationship. In the Fortune case we recognized that an employer may not in every instance terminate without liability an employment contract terminable at will. There we upheld the plaintiff's claim for future commissions based on past service when the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment without good cause and for the purpose of retaining the sales commissions for itself.

In an opinion that was issued after this case was argued we considered further the question of the rights of an employee at will who was discharged without good cause. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 384 Mass. 659 (1981). We noted that the absence of good cause to discharge an employee does not alone give rise to an enforceable claim for breach of a condition of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 671. We recognized that termination of at-will employment could give rise to a claim where the reason for the discharge was contrary to public policy. Id. at 668 n.6. The employer's predatory motivation in the Fortune case can be classified as a reason contrary to public policy. In the Gram case which did not involve an improper motive for the discharge we went beyond those cases that had allowed recovery for the discharge of an at-will employee because of a motivation which was contrary to public policy. We allowed the plaintiff an insurance salesman who if not discharged would have been entitled to renewal commissions to recover for "reasonably ascertainable future compensation based on his past services." Id. at 671 672 n.10. We concluded that when an employee is discharged without good cause the obligation of good faith and fair dealing imposed on an employer makes him liable for the loss of compensation that is clearly identifiable and is related to the employee's past service.

We come then to the circumstances of the case before us. The jury returned a special verdict (Mass. R. Civ. P. 49 [a] 365 Mass. 812 [1974]) and stated that the plaintiffs' at-will employment contracts were terminated in bad faith. This finding was based on an instruction that extended the concept of bad faith well beyond the limits expressed in our holding in the Fortune case. The Court charged the jury that each plaintiff could recover for the bad faith termination of his employment contract if Bristol-Myers had no good business or other legitimate reason for the termination and if Bristol-Myers was motivated solely or primarily by "bad faith malice ill-will spite personal hostility or retaliation." *fn4

The question for our decision is whether the evidence warranted a finding for the plaintiffs on their claims of a bad faith termination of their at-will employment. This is not a case in which the employer as in the Fortune case discharged an employee to deprive him of commissions already earned but not yet payable. Nor is this a case like the Gram case in which the employee lost reasonably ascertainable future compensation based on past services. There was no evidence that the plaintiffs' future earnings would be based in any respect on past sales of Bristol-Myers products. We have rejected the general concept of job security as a basis for allowing recovery for termination without cause of an at-will employee. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. supra at 671.

The plaintiffs argue that Bristol-Myers gave pretexts as reasons for terminating their employment. They correctly point out that the jury would have been warranted in finding that Bristol-Myers discharged them not because of poor work performance as Bristol-Myers asserted but because they refused to answer the questionnaire in full. We consider first the claim that because the reason for the discharge was merely a pretext the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for their discharge without cause. Next we consider whether the plaintiffs should be entitled to recover if as the jury could have found Bristol-Myers discharged them for failure to answer the questionnaire. *fn5

We decline to impose liability on an employer simply because it gave a false reason or a pretext for the discharge of an employee at will. Such an employer has no duty to give any reason at the time of discharging an employee at will. Where no reason need be given we impose no liability on an employer for concealing the real reason for an employee's discharge or for giving a reason that is factually unsupportable. As a kindness to an employee in his seeking future employment an employer may well not state its reasons fully and accurately. Here of course Bristol-Myers's motivation may not have been so noble. We conclude however that an at-will employee discharged without cause does not have a claim for damages simply because the employer gave him a false reason for his discharge. The balance of public policy considerations does not support the allowance of recovery of damages in such a case. *fn6

We come finally to the question whether the defendants should be liable for discharging any plaintiff for the incompleteness of his response to the questionnaire. As we have already said the jury would have been warranted in finding by way of reasonable inference that Bristol-Myers discharged each plaintiff for this reason. In the context of our opinions concerning the rights of at-will employees discharged without cause the question is whether some principle of public policy requires that Bristol-Myers be liable for such a discharge.

In assessing this question we note that no case has been cited to us nor are we aware of any case that has imposed liability on a private employer for discharging an at-will employee for the employee's failure to furnish personal information to the employer. *fn7 Although the Legislature has imposed restrictions on employers' seeking certain information from an employee or prospective employee it has not forbidden the gathering of information of the character sought in this case. *fn8 On the other hand if the questionnaire sought to obtain information in circumstances that constituted an "unreasonable substantial or serious interference with his privacy" in violation of the principles expressed in G. L. c. 214 SEC.1B the discharge of an employee for failure to provide such information could contravene public policy and warrant the imposition of liability on the employer for the discharge. In short if Bristol-Myers had no right to ask the questions that the plaintiffs declined to answer Bristol-Myers could be liable for discharging the plaintiffs for their failure to answer those questions. *fn9

We would not go so far as to say that an employer would always be liable for discharging an employee for his refusal to answer questions not relevant to its business purposes. In public policy terms it is the degree of intrusion on the rights of the employee which is most important. In measuring the nature of the intrusion at least as to its reasonableness (but perhaps as well as to its substantiality and seriousness) the nature of the employee's job is of some significance. The information that a high level or confidential employee should reasonably be expected to disclose is broader in scope and more personal in nature than that which should be expected from an employee who mows grass or empties waste baskets. A salesman responsible for the sale of drug products to hospitals doctors and pharmacists falls in the middle of this range but toward its upper side. The temperament and dedication of a salesman are important factors in his effectiveness and questions bearing on these subjects are certainly reasonable and should be expected.

The questionnaire entitled Biographical Summary sought information which it represented would be held in strict confidence. The subjects covered included business experience education family home ownership physical data activities and aims. In general each plaintiff furnished answers to the questions concerning his business experience education and family. *fn10 Their answers concerning their medical histories are varied. Questions answered by Flaherty but not the other two concerned (a) serious illnesses operations accidents or nervous disorders (b) smoking and drinking habits (c) off-the-job problems and (d) principal worries if any. Flaherty and Schleffer answered the request to list "Membership in civic professional or social organizations (Exclude racial religious and nationality groups)."

None of the plaintiffs answered the questions under the heading "AIMS." These questions concerning "AIMS " which we regard as appropriate to ask of a salesman and not improperly intrusive on his privacy rights asked each to state his qualifications for his job his principal strengths his principal weaknesses activities in which he preferred not to engage the income he would need to live the way he would like to live and his plans for the future. *fn11 The fact that the plaintiffs had worked for Bristol-Myers for a number of years in no way made the asking of these questions contrary to public policy. When seeking employment with Bristol-Myers each of the plaintiffs answered a questionnaire of the same general nature. They knew therefore from the beginning that Bristol-Myers was interested in personal information of this character in assessing a person's qualifications as a salesman.

We express no view as to whether in particular circumstances specific subjects (beyond those statutorily interdicted) may lie outside an employer's right of inquiry so as to make the employer liable for discharging an at-will employee who declines to respond to the inquiry. We conclude that this case is not one in which on the evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs public policy considerations justify the imposition of liability on the employer. Most of the unanswered questions were relevant to the plaintiffs' job qualifications and represented no invasion of the plaintiffs' rights of privacy protected by law. Questions about family and home ownership were probably not of much significance to Bristol-Myers but those questions were not improperly intrusive sought information mostly available in public records and were in any event largely answered. These questions were no more intrusive than those asked on an application for life insurance or for a bank loan. If there were some questions that may have been overreaching in the circumstances the fundamental fact remains that the plaintiffs declined to answer a large number of incontestably relevant and not unreasonably intrusive questions. No public policy considerations protect an at-will employee in such a circumstance.

We affirm the judgments for the defendants entered on their motion for judgments notwithstanding the jury's verdicts on the plaintiffs' claims that the defendants terminated their employment in violation of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing that should be imposed by law.

Judgments affirmed.

Concuring: ABRAMS

I concur with much of what the majority says in denying relief to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants invaded their right of privacy by requiring them to answer fully a questionnaire which could be used as the basis of a "comprehensive psychiatric evaluation." The plaintiffs produced some evidence in support of that claim but no evidence that Bristol-Myers so used the questionnaire. The reason may well be that Bristol-Myers in the past has been known as a "non-user" of personality tests. A. Westin Privacy and Freedom 137 372 (1967).

I agree that "[m]ost of the unanswered questions were relevant to the plaintiffs' job qualifications and represented no invasion of the plaintiffs' rights of privacy protected by law." Further in this case the plaintiffs voluntarily *fn1 answered the questions most likely to be viewed as objectionable. *fn2 The plaintiffs refused to answer or gave flippant answers (see supra at 309 n.11) to many relevant and unintrusive questions. *fn3 Therefore I conclude that the plaintiffs failed to show an invasion of their privacy.

As I read the opinion it implicitly recognizes that G. L. c. 214 SEC.1B reflects a legislative concern for basic fairness and an attempt to limit the extent to which informational activities of an employer may intrude on an employee's privacy. The opinion also suggests that employers may be limited to fair and unobtrusive methods of information collection and to the collection of information relevant and necessary to a business purpose.

I believe the opinion recognizes that a careful balancing must be made between privacy interests and the need for the requested information its materiality and its relevance. Therefore I would explicitly state the opinion's underlying premise: that an employee at will has an action for bad faith discharge if an employer discharges the employee for failure to provide private information. In such cases the issue would be "[a]t what point do inquiries about employees become unduly intrusive?" Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission: Personal Privacy in an Information Society 223 (1977).

Because of the plaintiffs' lack of proof the opinion does not and need not focus on that issue. Nor does it address whether questions are more intrusive when the information requested is largely irrelevant to any business purpose of the employer. *fn4 See Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission: Personal Privacy in an Information Society 236-237 (1977); Miller the Privacy Revolution: A Report from the Barricades 19 Washburn L. Rev. 1 19 (1979); Comment The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information: Striking a Balance Between Personal Privacy Interests and Organizational Information Needs 44 Alb. L. Rev. 589 601 (1980); Comment Employee Privacy Rights: A Proposal 47 Fordham L. Rev. 155 192-193 (1978). I recognize that these determinations are best made on a case by case basis. "A well settled legal doctrine embodies the work of many minds and has been tested in form as well as substance by trained critics whose practical interest it is to resist it at every step. These are advantages the want of which cannot be supplied by any faculty of generalization however brilliant. " O.W. Holmes Codes And The Arrangement of the Law 5 Am. L. Rev. 1 (1870). Therefore I concur.